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COMMENTS
ON KEEPING PIGS OUT OF THE PARLOR:
SPEECH AS PUBLIC NUISANCE AFTER FCC
v. PA CIFICA FO UNDA TION
EARL M. MALTZ* AND L. LYNN HOGUE**
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,I the Supreme Court held
that the Federal Communications Commission had at least lim-
ited power to impose sanctions for the broadcast of "indecent"
material, at least at certain times of the day, even though the
material broadcast was not obscene. A majority of the Court 2
explicitly accepted the idea that the government could regulate
some such speech on a public nuisance theory,' notwithstanding
the provisions of the first amendment. This comment will exam-
ine the theoretical underpinning of the public nuisance theory
and its potential impact in light of the Pacifica decision.
I. THE PuBLIc NUISANCE THEORY GENERALLY
At the outset it is important to define precisely what the
public nuisance theory for controlling speech entails. The argu-
ment is not that the prohibited speech falls outside the scope of
first amendment protections altogether; in this sense the theory
of Pacifica differs significantly from that of cases involving ob-
scenity4 and fighting words.- Rather, the concept is that the gov-
* B.A., 1972, Northwestern University; J.D., 1975, Harvard. Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
** A.B., 1966, William Jewell College; M.A., 1968, Ph.D., 1972, University of Tennes-
see; J.D., 1974, Duke University. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock School of Law. Member, Arkansas and North Carolina Bars.
1. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
2. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion that was joined in part by five justices. See 438
U.S. at 729-41, 748-51. The remaining portions of the Stevens opinion were joined only
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 742-48 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 755-62. Justice Brennan and Justice
Stewart each wrote dissenting opinions. Id. at 762-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 777-
80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3. See 438 U.S. at 750.
4. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
For a discussion of the potential use of nuisance law to control obscenity, see Hogue,
Regulating Obscenity Through the Power to Define and Abate Nuisance, 14 WAKE FOREST
L. Rav. 1 (1978).
5. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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ernment has legitimate interests in protecting sensibilities of the
citizenry at large from being shocked or outraged and in safe-
guarding the impressionable minds of children. At some point
these interests outweigh the right of a speaker to convey his mes-
sage in some particular fashion. Judge McGowan aptly summa-
rized the concept in Williams v. District of Columbia:
Apart from punishing profane or obscene words which are spo-
ken in circumstances which create a threat of violence, the state
may also have a legitimate interest in stopping one person from
"inflict[ing] injury" on others by verbally assaulting them with
language which is grossly offensive because of its profane or
obscene character. The fact that a person may constitutionally
indulge his taste for obscenities in private does not mean that
he is free to intrude them upon the attentions of others.'
By its nature, the public nuisance theory involves a kind of
content regulation in that the government necessarily decides
what words are profane or offensive and thus proscribable in some
circumstances. But the type of content regulation involved is
unusual in that it is unrelated to ideas qua ideas; it need not favor
any one kind of idea or shade of opinion over another. Under the
public nuisance theory any prohibition deals with the manner in
which an idea is expressed rather than the nature of the idea
itself.7 Ideologically neutral regulation under this concept thus
poses a significantly smaller threat to core first amendment val-
ues than does a typical content-oriented statute or ordinance.
At the same time, to attempt to analogize these regulations
too closely to classical time, place, and manner restrictions would
6. 419 F.2d 638, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901,
903-09 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
[T]he exception to First Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky is
not limited to words whose mere utterance entails a high probability of an
outbreak of physical violence. It also extends to the willful use of scurrilous
language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling audience ...
[that] may be so grossly offensive and emotionally disturbing as to be the
proper subject of criminal proscription, whether under a statute denominating
it disorderly conduct, or, more accurately, a public nuisance.
Id. at 905.06 (Powell, J., dissenting). The term at issue in Rosenfeld was "the adjective
'M ----- F ..... ' used on four occasions in the presence of women and children at a school
board meeting." Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67 (1953).
[Vol. 31
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be a mistake.8 While the communication of an idea itself will not
be banned, a speaker's ability to effectively express such an idea
may be intimately related to the type of language that he is
allowed to use. To use an extreme example, certain political can-
didates would be greatly hindered if public use of the word
"democrat" were proscribed as profane and offensive. Thus, the
public nuisance theory falls into a gray area of first amendment
jurisprudence that the Supreme Court has not explicitly dealt
with until quite recently.
II. THE PRE-Pacifica LAW: Cohen AND Erznoznik
When the Court did begin to deal with the problem, it ini-
tially indicated that the scope of the public nuisance theory as a
permissible limit on the right of free speech would be very lim-
ited. In Cohen v. California,9 a man had been convicted of
"maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct"' " for
wearing a jacket which bore the legend "F[ --- ] the Draft" while
in the corridor outside a municipal courtroom." The state argued
that this application of the statute was justified by the govern-
mental interest in "protect[ing] the sensitive from otherwise
unavoidable exposure to" this "crude form of protest"' 2-a clas-
sic nuisance argument.
Rejecting this argument for the Court, Justice Harlan ob-
served that "words are often chosen as much for their emotive as
their cognitive force" 3 and noted the possibility that the proscrip-
tion of certain words runs "a substantial risk of suppressing ideas
in the process." 4 He further relied upon the absence of any appar-
ent principled limits to the government's asserted power to
"cleanse public debate.' 1 5 He concluded that "[t]he ability of
government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off dis-
course solely to protect others from hearing it is . . .dependent
8. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, reh. denied, 385 U.S. 1020 (1966)
(prohibition of demonstrations on jailhouse grounds); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (regulation of sound trucks).
9. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
10. Id. at 16 (quoting CAL. PEAL CODE § 415 (West 1970)).
11. 403 U.S. at 16.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id. at 26.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 25.
1980]
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upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being in-
vaded in an essentially intolerable manner." 8 Findifig no such
privacy interest involved in Cohen, the Court reversed the convic-
tion.
While generally hostile to the public nuisance concept in a
first amendment context, the Cohen Court did not entirely fore-
close the use of the theory, even as applied to language used in a
public place. First, Justice Harlan suggested that the result
might have been different if there had been an actual complaint
from a person who had been powerless to avoid seeing the offend-
ing slogan." More importantly, he also implied that a statute'
which was more narrowly drawn to obviate "the special plight of
the captive auditor" could well have constitutionally supported
the conviction in Cohen.'" Thus, taken alone, Cohen is not incon-
sistent with the public nuisance theory.
However, the public nuisance theory was seriously under-
mined by the decision in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.'9 A
city ordinance declared it a public nuisance and a punishable
offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing
nudity when such films would be visible from a public street or
place."0 The Court struck down this ordinance as facially invalid
under the first amendment. Justice Powell's majority opinion
contended that the challenged ordinance was analogous to laws
which discriminated among speakers based on ideas expressed.
2'
Echoing Justice Harlan's Cohen opinion, the Court found such
restrictions could be upheld "only when the speaker intrudes on
the privacy of the home . . . or the degree of captivity [of the
audience] makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or audi-
tor to avoid exposure. '2 2 Justice Powell found the limited privacy
interest of those on the public streets insufficient to support the
challenged ordinance.
He also rejected arguments based upon the governmental
16. Id. at 21.
17. See id. at 22.
18. Id. at 22 n.4.
19. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
20. See id. at 206-07.
21. Id. at 209. Specific reference was made to Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972), in which the Court struck down a statute which discriminated between
picketing relating to labor disputes and other forms of picketing, and Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953), in which the Court held an ordinance unconstitutional because
it discriminated againE& Jehovah's Witnesses.
22. 422 U.S. at 209 (citations omitted).
380 [Vol. 31
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interests in protecting children2 and promoting traffic safety. 4
With respect to the former, Justice Powell found the ordinance
fatally overbroad;2 the latter theory was rejected because there
was no evidence demonstrating that nudity was any more dis-
tracting than other scenes regularly presented on movie screens. 6
Thus, the Court held the challenged ordinance unconstitutional
on its face.
The precise problem that the Erznoznik majority saw in the
challenged ordinance was not entirely clear from the Court's
opinion. At one point Justice Powell seemed to suggest the diffi-
culty was that the ordinance dealt only with the depictions of
nudity rather than with all movies which might offend passers-
by.2 This distinction makes little sense, however, since the re-
mainder of the opinion indicated that the primary concern was
that the ordinance discriminated on the basis of content. A limi-
tation on the showing of vulgar or offensive movies generally is
no less a discrimination on the basis of content than is a mere ban
on the presentation of nddity; the only relevant difference be-
tween the two types of regulation that proscribe depiction of nud-
ity is that one discriminates against a narrower class of speech.
But in any event, the Erznoznik opinion was a serious blow
to the use of the public nuisance theory to control offensive
speech. In rejecting the Jacksonville ordinance, the Court re-
jected what seemed to be the major option remaining after
Cohen-the use of a regulation which specifically defined the
types of speech proscribed and the circumstances under which
such speech was prohibited. Indeed, Justice Powell's reasoning
seemed to threaten even conventional indecent exposure laws. In
response to this concern, he argued that the Jacksonville ordi-
nance dealt with "[s]cenes of nudity . . . [that] must be con-
sidered as part of the whole work," whereas public nudity is gen-
erally not an intrinsic part of an attempt to convey a message.28
Consider the case, however, of a person walking naked down a
public street emblazoned with the slogan "John Smith is an
attractive candidate with nothing to hide." Certainly, the fact
23. 422 U.S. at 212-13.
24. Id. at 214.
25. Id. at 213-14.
26. Id. at 214-15.
27. Id. at 208.
28. Id. at 211 n.7.
1980]
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that the nudity was inextricably connected with the message con-
veyed would not prevent the human billboard from being ar-
rested, convicted, and punished. To hold that the first amend-
ment prohibited such a conviction would be rather startling. 9
Given Justice Powell's reasoning, however, it is difficult to see
how the constitutionality of such a conviction would be sustained.
HI. REVIVAL OF THE PUBLIC NUISANCE THEORY: Young AND
Pacifica
The first indication that the public nuisance theory might
retain some viability came in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc." Young involved a city ordinance which included "adult"
book stores and movie theaters (defined as those establishments
presenting material which emphasized sex or nudity) among
"regulated uses. ' 31 No regulated use was allowed within 500 feet
of a residential area, and no two such uses were to be located
within 1,000 feet of each other.32 The argument was made that
because not all theaters were similarly restricted, the first amend-
ment rights of owners of adult theaters were violated by the ordi-
nance. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the
ordinance was an acceptable land-use regulation.
The dissent attempted to analogize the case to Cohen and
Erznoznik;33 however, the issue presented in Young was plainly
different. The claim of the government in Young was not that
unwilling viewers or hearers would be offended by the speech at
issue-obviously no unwilling viewers would be exposed to a
movie presented in a theater. Rather, the question was whether
the state can constitutionally determine that concentration of a
certain type of business-in this case business concerned pri-
marily with sexual activity"4-would cause a neighborhood to
29. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("No
one would suggest that the First Amendment permits nudity in public places. .. .");
Wilkenson, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 Commi L. REv. 563
(1967); Hogue, Regulating Obscenity Through the Power to Define and Abate Nuisances,
14 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 1, 30 n.148 (1978) and sources cited therein.
30. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
31. Id. at 52-53 and 53 nn.4-5.
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id. at 85 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
34. The ordinance also designated cabarets, establishments for the sale of beer or
intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises, hotels or motels, pawnshops, pool or
billiard halls, public lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance
halls as regulated uses. Id. at 53 n.3.
[Vol. 31
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deteriorate, defining those businesses by types of speech." The
Court's affirmative answer to this question does not contradict
the holdings in Cohen and Erznoznik. Young does make clear,
however, that the nature of speech may in some circumstances be
appropriately considered in designing governmental regulations,
and this principle is critical to the survival of the public nuisance
theory.
In Pacifica, the Court placed more direct limitations on the
principles enunciated in Cohen and Erznoznik.31 Pacifica involves
broadcast of a monologue by comedian George Carlin entitled
"Filthy Words"3 in which he satirizes the attitude of society
toward the use of seven words "you couldn't say on the public
* * .airwaves. ' 3 In the course of the monologue, Carlin made
repeated use of the "forbidden" words. In response to a complaint
from a person who had heard the monologue, the Federal Com-
munications Commission issued an order holding that the station
"could have been the subject of administrative sanctions. ' 3 In so
doing, the Commission relied heavily on a nuisance theory."
Reversing a court of appeals decision finding this order in-
valid,4" the Supreme Court reinstated the Commission order.
Dealing only with the power to prohibit the broadcast of the
Carlin monologue itself at the particular hour at which it was
broadcast,42 the Court explicitly approved the use of the nuisance
35. See 427 U.S. at 83-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). Other cases, while
not dealing directly with the public nuisance theory, also seemed to suggest that its utility
for controlling speech would be quite limited. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697
(1974) (per curiam) (reversing contempt conviction for the use of word "chicken-sh[--j"
in court); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam) (reversing expul-
sion from school for distribution of newspaper "containing forms of indecent speech").
37. A full transcript of the monologue was included as an appendix to the majority
opinion in Pacifica. See 438 U.S. 726, app. at 751 (1978).
38. Id. at 729.
39. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The Commission argued that its
authority to issue this order derived from 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), which made it a crime
to utter "any obscene, indecent or profane language" by means of radio communication.
40. See 56 F.C.C.2d at 97.
41. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 566 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
42. One opinion in the court of appeals dealt with the FCC opinion as the functional
equivalent of a rule and concluded that it was overbroad and thus unconstitutional on its
face. 556 F.2d at 13-14 (Tamm, J.). See generally Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rxv. 844 (1970). Arguing that "[t]he general statements
in the Commission's memorandum opinion do not change the character of its order," the
Supreme Court restricted its review to the specific factual context of the case in which
1980]
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rationale." Justice Stevens concluded that
a "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place-
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." We simply
hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered
the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend
on proof that the pig is obscene."
The key factor on which the Pacifica Court relied in distin-
guishing Cohen and Erznoznik is that the Carlin monologue was
broadcast over the public airwaves, rather than simply being
worn on a jacket as in Cohen or projected on a movie screen as in
Erznoznik. 1 The principle that the content of radio broadcasts
could, consistently with the first amendment, be subject to more
sweeping controls than the content of speech generally was estab-
lished in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC."8 Red Lion involved
an attack on both the general principles of the "fairness doctrine"
and the more specific requirements of regulations governing per-
sonal attacks and political editorials. The former requires that
broadcasters give adequate coverage to controversial issues of
public importance and that this coverage include reasonable op-
the order was issued. 438 U.S. at 732.
But even accepting the Court's characterization of the Commission order, there still
remained the question whether, as interpreted by the Commission, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 itself
was unconstitutional on its face. Overbreadth problems could be avoided simply by a
construction limiting the power of the Commission to those applications that were consti-
tutional. However, there still would remain possible problems of vagueness. See Amicus
Curiae Brief for American Broadcasting Co. at 33-39, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978). See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). Justice Stevens confronted this problem directly,
arguing that because the speech at issue was at the periphery of first amendment protec-
tion, facial review of the statute was inappropriate. 438 U.S. at 743 (opinion of Stevens,
J.). However, on this point he spoke for only three members of the Court. The remain-
ing members of the majority contented themselves with a reference to the practice of
not deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily and to the contention that a "narrow
focus is conducive to the orderly development of this relatively new and difficult area of
law, in the first instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing courts." Id. at
756 (Powell, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 750.
44. Id. at 750-51 (quoting in part Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926) (Sutherland, J.)). Pacifica also argued that the word "indecent" in § 1464 should
be interpreted to mean only "obscene" in order to avoid constitutional problems and that
the Commission order should be overturned for exceeding statutory authority. Id. at 777-
80 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The majority rejected this contention. Id. at 738-41.
45. Id. at 748-51.
46. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). For a general discussion of the problems raised by Red Lion,
see Van Alstyne, The M6bius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion,
29 S.C.L. REv. 539 (1978).
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portunities for the presentation of opposing viewpoints on these
issues." The latter requires more specifically that when one is
subject to a personal attack in the context of a discussion of a
controversial issue of public importance he must be given an
opportunity to respond to this attack,4" and that when a broad-
caster endorses a candidate for election the other candidates for
the office must be offered reply time."
The broadcasters mounted a first amendment challenge to
these regulations, noting that "[n]o man may [constitu-
tionally] be prevented from saying or publishing what he thinks,
or from refusing in his speech or other utterances to give equal
weight to the views of his opponents."5 Since this principle would
rather plainly prevent the government from ordering a newspaper
to print a defense of the political beliefs of the publisher's oppo-
nents,"1 the argument was made that the same protection applied
to broadcasters as well.
The Court rejected this contention, asserting that
"differences in the characteristics of news media justify differ-
ences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."52 Jus-
tice White argued that the critical factor in the case was that the
scarcity of available radio frequencies required the government to
to ration the right to use the frequencies among competing appli-
cants. In such a context he reasoned that to allow successful
applicants an unrestricted right to broadcast (or not to broadcast)
whatever they pleased would place those applicants' rights in a
superior position to the rights of unsuccessful applicants even
though, for first amendment purposes, successful and unsuccess-
ful applicants stand on an equal footing. 3 Further, the Court
47. 395 U.S. at 377. The Federal Communications Commission has recently codified
and reformulated the fairness doctrine. See The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48
F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
48. 395 U.S. at 378.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 386.
51. At the time Red Lion was decided, the Court had not passed on the issue of the
constitutionality of similar regulations of newspapers. Subsequently, in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court held unconstitutional a Florida
statute which granted to a political candidate an enforceable right to equal space to
answer criticism and attacks on his record by newspapers.
52. 395 U.S. at 386 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 387-89.
1980]
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found that if licensees were permitted the option of broadcasting
only one viewpoint on controversial issues of public importance,
the public's collective first amendment right to be informed in an
"uninhibited marketplace of ideas" might well be violated.-4 It
was this last right which Justice White deemed paramount, 5 and
the various challenged regulations were seen as an appropriate
vehicle to vindicate this interest.
While the basic principle that radio broadcasts pose special
first amendment problems is critical to the result in Pacifica, the
rationale underlying the Red Lion result provides little or no sup-
port for Justice Stevens' Pacifica opinion. One can plausibly
posit, as did the Red Lion Court, a first amendment right to hear
varying viewpoints; by contrast, freedom of speech clearly does
not encompass any right not to hear what is offensive to the
listener. Thus, if Pacifica is to be adequately distinguished from
earlier cases, the distinction must rest on other special character-
istics of the broadcast media.
One factor upon which the Pacifica Court placed heavy reli-
ance was the potential of broadcast media to invade the privacy
of listeners. In Cohen and Erznoznik, any unwilling exposure to
the offensive message would take place in public areas. When
venturing into such areas, the Court reasoned that one must nec-
essarily assume some risk of viewing offensive material. 57 By con-
trast, radio broadcasts such as those in Pacifica have at least the
potential of invading one's home, where one's right to control the
sights and sounds viewed and heard is paramount.
In support of this distinction, Justice Stevens analogized
Pacifica to laws regulating annoying or harassing telephone calls
5
1
and cited Rowan v. Post Office Department.59 Rowan dealt with
the rights of householders to have their names removed from
mailing lists. Under a federal statute, if one had received adver-
tisements which offered for sale "matter which the addressee in
his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually
54. Id. at 389-90.
55. Id. at 390.
56. 438 U.S. at 749 & n.27. The complaint from which the FCC action in Pacifica
arose came from one who heard the Carlin monologue while riding in an automobile. Id.
at 730.
57. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
58. 438 U.S. at 749.
59. Id. at 748 (citing 397 U.S. at 728 (1970)).
386 [Vol. 31
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provocative," he could send a notice to the Postmaster General,
who would then issue an order directing the sender to refrain from
further mailings to the named addressee and to delete the
addressee's name from all mailing lists." The mailers argued
that this statute violated their first amendment right to com-
municate.' Noting that the "mailer's right to communicate is
circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the addressee" re-
questing that the mailings be terminated, the Court rejected
this argument, 2 concluding that "a mailer's right to communi-
cate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee.
'6 3
But neither Rowan nor the harassing telephone call example
is closely analogous to the situation in Pacifica. For if one wishes
to be certain that he will not be exposed to indecent radio broad-
casts in his home, he can resort to the simple expedient of not
turning on his radio. When he does choose to listen to the elec-
tronic medium, the listener has in effect voluntarily invited a
segment of public life into his hitherto private dwelling. In short,
the privacy question in Pacifica is not whether the listener has a
right not to hear indecent language in his home, but rather
whether he has a right to listen to his radio without having any
possibility of hearing such language even for the short period of
time necessary to turn off the radio or change stations.
The differences between the respective communications
media suggest another distinction between Rowan and Pacifica.
In the former, any action by a recipient of sexually explicit mate-
rial only affected his own exposure to that material; any other
addressee who wished to continue to receive the offending adver-
tisement could continue to do so. By contrast, vindication of the
unwilling hearer's privacy right in Pacifica of necessity deprives
those who might wish to hear the Carlin dialogue of access to it
through the radio. In this regard, Pacifica was strikingly similar
to Erznoznik.64
This is one of a number of close analogies between Erznoznik
and Pacifica. Both involved communications media intended to
reach large numbers of people simultaneously. Further, unlike
60. 397 U.S. at 732.
61. Id. at 735.
62. Id. at 737.
63. Id. at 736-37.
64. See 438 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1980]
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Cohen, neither presentation was primarily aimed at shocking
unwilling or unwary viewer/listeners; the exposure of such viewers
was solely an accidental byproduct of attempts to reach willing
consumers. 5 Indeed, in some respects Pacifica presented a more
compelling case for first amendment protection than did
Erznoznik. In Pacifica, the listener could always easily terminate
his exposure to the offensive broadcast; by contrast, in Erznoznik
the possibility of averting one's eyes may be largely theoretical.
For example, when one is driving down a road from which the
view is dominated by a drive-in movie screen, looking away may
well result in a traffic accident." Moreover, the proposed remedy
in Erznoznik was much more narrowly focused on the perceived
evil than was the sanction in Pacifica. In the former, the chal-
lenged ordinance only required a screen that would block the view
of offended viewers and random bystanders; those wishing to view
the movie could still attend the drive-in theater. In Pacifica, on
the other hand, the FCC action effectively banned the use of radio
for broadcast of monologues such as "The Seven Dirty Words" (at
least during most of the day67), thus depriving even willing listen-
ers of the opportunity to hear the presentation over the radio."5
Ranged against these factors, the distinction based on the
fact that radio broadcasts can come into listeners' homes seems
weak indeed-especially given the fact that the broadcast can
only be heard if invited by the listener. Thus, if Pacifica is to be
65. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 210 n.6 (1975). See also Rosen-
feld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. See Parker v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) (Brandeis, J.).
67. The FCC decision left open the possibility that the Carlin monologue could be
legally broadcast during hours when few children were likely to be listening. See 438 U.S.
at 750 n.28.
68. See 438 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In another context, Justice Stevens
attempted to defuse this argument by reference to the potential for willing listeners to
obtain access to the monologue through other media such as tapes, records, and night-
clubs. 438 U:S. at 750 n.28. However, this contention ignores two points. First, at the very
least, the other suggested media, unlike radio, entail expenditures by the listener; thus,
the FCC ban would deter some listeners because of increased cost. See generally Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 n.8 (1975) (regulation which raises costs to only
those theaters which show motion pictures containing nudity violates the first amend-
ment). Second, Justice Stevens' argument ignores the special role that the broadcast
media plays in the dissemination of material such as the Carlin monologue. The radio
provides a unique forum by which persons are informed of the existence and content of
such material; if broadcast is not allowed, some persons who might wish to hear (and later
purchase) the Carlin monologue might remain forever unaware of its existence. See
generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (first amendment
rights of listeners paramount).
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convincingly distinguished from Erznoznik, the distinction must
be based on other factors.
The other consideration on which the Pacifica majority relied
is the "unique accessibility" of the broadcast media to children,
particularly unsupervised children." This factor is related to two
closely connected but analytically separable governmental inter-
ests. The first is a direct concern for the psychic well-being of the
children. In order to protect the children from bad influences, it
is argued that the state must have some power to prohibit the
dissemination of certain messages to them even when the first
amendment would protect the communication of the same mes-
sages to adults.70
In addition, the likelihood that many children in the audi-
ence will be unsupervised while listening to the radio implicates
the interest of the state in preserving parental autonomy. In our
society, parents are expected to fill the primary role in guiding
the moral development of their children, avoiding their exposure
to material such as the Carlin monologue. The efforts of the gov-
ernment to prevent unsupervised children from hearing such
broadcasts may be viewed as vindicating the interests of these
parents as well as the independent interests of the state in pro-
tecting the morality of its youth.7
Ginsberg v. New York72 is the prime example of the Court's
recognition that the government may regulate some speech di-
rected at minors even when the same regulation would violate the
first amendment if applied to speech aimed at adults.73 Ginsberg
dealt with a New York statute that proscribed the sale to persons
under the age of seventeen of materials defined'by the statute to
be "obscene." The statutory definition of obscenity closely
tracked the prevailing constitutional standards for the identifica-
tion of obscenity; however, these standards had been modified to
focus on the effect the material would have on a minor rather
than on a member of the population at large. Thus, a statutory
violation occurred if a child under seventeen was sold a magazine
portraying nudity that "(i) predominantly appeals to the pru-
rient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently
69. 438 U.S. at 749-60.
70. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
71. See id. at 639.
72. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
73. Id. at 636-37.
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offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors."74
The net result of such a statute was that minors were prohib-
ited from buying materials to which adults could not constitu-
tionally be denied access. Nonetheless, the Court refused to strike
down the statute, holding that special governmental interests
with respect to minors justified the distinction.
Pacifica represents a significant extension of the Ginsberg
rationale in at least two respects. First, Ginsberg dealt solely with
the printed media; thus the challenged law could be tailored to
affect the ability of children only to obtain the offending material.
By contrast, the FCC action in Pacifica of necessity had to re-
strict the access of adults to the Carlin monologue in order to
prevent unsupervised children from being exposed to the mono-
logue.
Perhaps more importantly, the Pacifica opinion greatly ex-
panded the type of speech that can constitutionally be controlled
on the ground that children may be exposed to it. The theory of
Ginsberg was that even though certain sexually oriented speech
was not obscene when directed at adults, the same speech became
obscene (and thus no longer protected) when read or viewed by
children." Erznoznik strongly suggested that only speech that is
obscene for minors could be controlled under the governmental
power to protect children and preserve parental autonomy.76 But
in Pacifica, there was not even a suggestion that the Carlin mono-
logue would be considered obscene even if directed only to mi-
nors. Certainly it does not bear the traditional indicia of obscen-
ity; while the monologue may in the broadest sense be seen as
concerned with sex, the broadcast was not erotic in any sense.
Further, on this point the principles developed in Pacifica
cannot be limited to the -electronic broadcast media alone. The
particular characteristics of those media may explain why the
state may affect the rights of adults under the rationale of pro-
tecting children, but those characteristics can have no relevance
in the determination of those words from which the state is em-
powered to shield children. Thus, Pacifica must be seen as ex-
panding the governmental power over not only radio and televi-
74. 390 U.S. at 633 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 484h (1)(f)(Consol. 1965)).
75. Id. at 641.
76. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 n.15 (1975).
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sion, but also over books, movies, and other forms of communica-
tion.
IV. FUTURE OF THE PUBLC NUISANCE THEORY
Whether or not it is convincingly distinguishable from
Erznoznik, Pacifica clearly establishes the right of the govern-
ment to use a public nuisance theory to place some limitations
on the manner in which ideas are expressed. The issue then be-
comes what limitations the first amendment imposes upon this
power. Justice Stevens apparently envisions a kind of balancing
test based upon the various factors that contribute to the overall
concept of "context."77
One critical factor is the composition of the audience that is
exposed to the offending communication. Where this audience is
composed entirely (or almost entirely) of willing adult listeners
or watchers, the case for allowing government regulation is weak.
Not only is the state interest in suppressing the expression in such
a case minimal, but the first amendment rights of the listen-
ers-rights that the Red Lion Court deemed "paramount""T-
militate strongly against regulation or suppression. Conversely,
as the number of unwilling listeners and unsupervised children in
the audience becomes larger, the governmental interest in pro-
tecting these listeners from unwanted intrusions becomes weight-
ier and the use of the nuisance theory becomes more attractive.
Another closely related factor is the type of forum into which
the offending communication is projected.71 When the unwilling
listener is exposed to the communicator in an area where he has
a reasonable expectation of privacy (his home being the paradigm
example)," then his interest in avoiding the communication be-
comes weightier. Thus, the state's interest in protecting the lis-
tener takes on added significance. By contrast, a person in a
public area is required to take a greater risk of being exposed to
unwelcome sights or sounds and the governmental interest in
protecting him in such an area is correspondingly less substan-
tial."1
77. See 438 U.S. at 750.
78. 395 U.S. at 390.
79. 438 U.S. at 748.
80. See Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
81. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-11 (1975); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
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Finally, the precise content of the message sought to be regu-
lated is also an important factor in the balance."s When a broad-
cast contains only isolated expletives, the potential unavoidable
damage to the listeners' sensibilities is quite limited; after hear-
ing the first offending words, the sensitive listener will be able to
avoid substantial further embarassment or indignity simply by
changing channels. On the other hand, the use of potentially
offensive language in the Carlin monologue is so pervasive that
one would be exposed to a large volume of such language even in
the short time that it would take for a listener to aiscern the
subject matter of the monologue and take the necessary action to
avoid further exposure.
All of the factors discussed thus far bear on the intensity of
the governmental interest in protecting unwilling listeners and
children from sustaining offense or harm by being exposed to
inappropriate speech. Justice Stevens would also have the level
of first amendment protection afforded to any given speech de-
pend upon the social value attached to that speech. 3 Because of
the nature of the Carlin monologue, Justice Stevens viewed it as
being at the periphery of the values that the first amendment was
designed to protect.8 He argued that regulations such as those
involved in Pacifica should thus be subject to less stringent judi-
cial scrutiny than controls on more conventional political
speech.9
On this point, Justice Stevens spoke for only three members
of the Court; a majority of the justices took the position that the
content of the protected, noncommercial speech was irrelevant to
the degree of first amendment protection accorded to such
speech.8 Nonetheless, the Stevens' viewpoint might have a signif-
icant influence on the outcome of later first amendment cases
argued under the public nuisance theory. A broadcast of offensive
language in the context of political discussion or a "serious" artis-
tic work might be viewed by one or more of those fully concurring
in the Stevens opinion as deserving more stringent first amend-
82. 438 U.S. at 750.
83. Id. at 744-48 (opinion of Stevens, J.). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63-73 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
84. 438 U.S. at 743 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
85. Id. at 744-47 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
86. Id.. at 744-45; id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 762-63 (Brennan, J.,
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ment protection than the Carlin monologue." This in turn might
lead to the conclusion that the broadcast could not be regulated.
Given the close division of the Court in Pacifica, the shift of even
a single vote could be critical.
V. CoNCIusMN
The Pacifica decision makes clear that the public nuisance
theory for controlling speech retains some vitality, notwithstand-
ing the apparently near-fatal blows dealt to the concept by the
Cohen and Erznoznik cases. The long-term significance of the
Court's approval of the action against the broadcasters of the
Carlin monologue may be limited by two factors. First, Pacifica
was explicitly limited to the issue of control of a specific broad-
cast on a medium over which the government has historically
been constitutionally allowed to exercise an unusual measure of
content control. Thus, the case left unresolved whether a more
general statute can be drafted which would effectively implement
the public nuisance theory in other media of communication
while at the same time being sufficiently narrow and specific in
its terms to satisfy the stringent standards established by Cohen
and Erznoznik.
Second and equally important is that the order in Pacifica
was upheld by only the narrowest of margins, and that the five
justice majority gives every sign of being a very fragile coalition.
There was sufficient common ground for a majority opinion to be
produced; however, at the same time, even the members of the
majority indicated that they had substantial differences of opin-
ion over the proper mode of analysis to be employed.
87. See 438 U.S. at 747 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
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